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Abstract: This paper aims at analyzing the developments of the last decade and a half of monetary 
policy transparency followed by the central banks (CBs) in Central and Eastern European countries 
on the road to the euro adoption and to compare the results with those identified in the case of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). We approached the transparency level from the perspective of 
monetary policy strategies they use. The main results indicate increasing transparency within the 
considered timeframe for all monetary authorities subject to analysis, regardless of their monetary 
policy strategy, a higher level of transparency in the case of CBs applying a strategy of inflation 
targeting (IT) compared to those using the exchange rate as nominal anchor; a similar degree of 
transparency of the ECB and monetary authorities targeting inflation; the existence of a high degree 
of transparency, low inflation and stronger economic development in CEE states where the CBs target 
inflation compared to monetary authorities that are geared towards exchange rate targeting. 
Keywords: CB governance framework; inflation targeting; exchange rate targeting; Central and 
Eastern Europe 
JEL Classification: E50; E52; E58 
 
1. Introduction 
Alongside independence and democratic accountability, transparency of central 
banks in conducting monetary policy appears to be the third pillar of the monetary 
authorities’ governance framework.  
The present paper traces the recent evolutions of the monetary policy transparency 
degree implemented by central banks in Central and Eastern European countries 
following a process of convergence towards the euro area, with emphasis on the 
monetary policy strategies they use. The analysis includes the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania, Hungary (countries where the central banks apply a strategy of 
inflation targeting), Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania (countries where monetary 
authorities approach the exchange rate as nominal anchor) and the ECB (with its 
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distinctive monetary policy strategy based on two pillars). In this regard, the 
transparency of selected central banks’ monetary policy is calibrated by the index 
built by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). 
Over the last two decades, we note the considerable effort of central banks to 
increase the transparency of monetary policy, seen as a situation absent of 
asymmetric information in terms of monetary policy making (Geraats, 2002). This 
trend manifests due to the benefits of a high degree of transparency, benefits that 
can be addressed from two perspectives, political and economic. Thus, if from a 
political standpoint, the transparency of monetary policy appears as an 
indispensable attribute of central banks accountability (Ortiz, 2009), increased 
transparency generates a number of obvious advantages including on economic 
line: diminished inflation and the anchoring of inflationary expectations, 
credibility, reputation and predictability of central banks (Minegishi and Cournede, 
2009). 
Especially important for the measuring of CBs transparency is the Geraats (2002) - 
Eijfinger and Geraats (2006) - Dincer and Eichengreen (2007, 2009) - Siklos 
(2010) sequence of works, as it provides a specific multidimensional index, a 
comprehensive database and a common analysis methodology. Geraats (2002) 
highlighted the central bank transparency components, Eijffinger and Geraats 
(2006) provided systematic evidence of increased central bank transparency, 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) offered the most comprehensive set of data on 
banks' transparency emphasizing the upward transparency trend at a global level, 
Geraats (2009) used their laborious dataset and analyzed the development of 
transparency with focus on different types of monetary policy strategy followed by 
central banks, while Siklos (2010) reached an important conclusion for the present 
approach, showing that unlike other regions, the CBs in Central and Eastern 
European countries reveal during the considered time span a higher increase in the 
transparency degree. 
The potential impact of the recent financial crisis on the transparency of monetary 
policy is highlighted by Csávás et al. (2011) study of all five components of 
Eijffinger-Geraats index. In line with political transparency, currently a major 
discrepancy may occur in de jure and de facto ordering of central bank objectives, 
which could lead to the diminishing of their transparency. In terms of the economic 
transparency and of implemented policy, the loss of confidence in the models used 
and by default in the forecasting ability of the central banks could generate a 
decrease in their level of transparency. As regards the procedural transparency and 
the policy transparency we note that in times of crises, central banks are reluctant 
to communicating hazards and systemic risks raised given that by doing so they 
may amplify turbulences. In line with the operational transparency, the 
involvement of unconventional monetary policy instruments may reduce the 
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transparency of central banks towards the objectives pursued and the explaining the 
decisions that motivate the use of such instruments. 
 
2. Methodology 
Given the aforementioned benefits (related to the multidimensional existence of a 
comprehensive database and a common methodology) for analyzing the evolution 
of the transparency of monetary policy implemented by central banks in the CEE 
countries acceding to the euro area based on the type of monetary policy strategy 
followed, we will use the Geraats-Eijffinger index. 
This specific indicator addresses the transparency of monetary policy on five 
components: political transparency, economic, procedural, of the policy and 
operational transparency. A detailed description of the index can be found in 
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). The dataset supporting the analysis is built by 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2009), later updated by Siklos (2010), and extended by 
the author until the end of 2012 in the case of selected central banks1. We updated 
the available information on the basis of data found in various documents from 
selected central banks websites (statute, statements on monetary policy decisions, 
published projections, minutes, various reports). It should also be noted that we 
slightly changed the datasets developed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) and 
Siklos (2010). 
For obvious reasons of space, a detailed methodology for calculating the index of 
transparency, of specific elements that justify the award of component scores and 
criteria, as well as comprehensive results of measuring the degree of transparency 
can be obtained on request from the author. 
 
3. Evolution of Central Banks Transparency Degree  
The analysis of the transparency of central banks in CEE countries acceding to the 
euro area in relation to monetary policy strategies they use is summarized in Figure 
1. 
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Figure 1. The Evolution of Monetary Policy Transparency Degree between 1999 and 
Note: The classification of monetary policy strategies followed by the central banks of 
selected countries in 2012 according to IMF 
and Exchange Restrictions 2012”, respectively direct inflation targeting: th
Republic, Poland, Romania, Hungary; exchange rate targeting: Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania. 
The analysis results indicated a strong upward trend of monetary policy 
transparency in selected CEE countries, far exceeding the global average of CBs 
transparency levels. Monetary authorities in Central and Eastern European 
countries using a strategy of inflation targeting have a similar degree of 
transparency to the ECB, while those targeting the exchange rate display a much 
lower level of transparency. The 
strategies appear to be consistent with the literature, central banks using a strategy 
of targeting the exchange rate, as a consequence of monetary policy independence 
loss in the context of capital flows free mo
monetary policy actions.  Inflation targeting presents an additional challenge as 
long as the objective is imperfectly controlled, with an extended and variable lag, 
thus requiring a higher degree of transparency. 
 
4. The Analysis of the Current Level of Central Banks Transparency 
As regards the political transparency 
monetary policy can be found at a generalized level, in the context of all monetary 
strategies applied by the ce
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time, an explicit ordering can be identified for monetary policy strategies of 
considered central banks, taking into account the primary objective of maintaining 
price stability. Regarding the prima
that follow an IT strategy have set a numerical value for inflation, which in fact 
represents the its distinguishing. Although the European Central Bank does not 
apply an IT strategy it sets a clear quantit
level, but close to 2%). 
Figure 2. Political Transparency in 2012
In the case of central banks using the exchange rate as nominal anchor, the target 
calibration is approached from a
an intermediate target (derived from their commitment to keeping its currency 
fixed against the anchor). However, explicit independence on their instruments is 
more frequently used for inflation targeting,
targeting (for instance, Latvia). Such a fact appears explicable as long as the lack of 
any discrete feature specific to exchange rate targeting strategy makes the 
independence on instruments less relevant.
The inclusion of economic transparency
in CEE countries committed to joining the euro area, as well as the European 
Central Bank publish economic data relevant to the conduct of monetary policy 
(money supply, inflation, GDP,
of the GDP gap, but given the difficulties of measuring and forecasting the 
potential output, such an option is practiced by only a few countries (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary). At the same time, if CBs subject
strategy of inflation targeting and the European Central Bank design quarterly 
numerical forecasts for inflation and GDP in the medium term, such a practice 
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cannot be identified in the case of all monetary authorities geared towards
exchange rate targeting (e.g. Bulgaria). Since inflation forecast plays a vital role 
under an IT strategy, central banks' macroeconomic forecasts are often the focus of 
the CBs communication policy.
In addition, the use of an inflation targeting strategy 
banks publish macroeconomic analysis and forecasting models, but from all 
monetary authorities that follows exchange rate targeting only the central bank of 
Latvia is transparent in terms of techniques it applies.
Figure
The focus on procedural transparency
central banks consider especially important to describe the monetary policy 
framework through the explicit communication of the rule or strategy applied often 
explained in a didactical manner (the adjustment of 
need when medium-term inflation forecasts deviates from the inflation fixed value, 
taking into account, in fact, the targeting of forecasted inflation). An explicit 
communication of the monetary strategy can be easily observed i
all selected central banks oriented towards the exchange rate targeting, which 
derives from the automatic nature of monetary policy conducting rule. However, 
major differences occur in the publication of minutes and individual voting of th
members of monetary policy committees.
Such practices are absent both in the context of CBs using a strategy of exchange 
rate targeting, and of the European Central Bank. They can only be found in most 
CBs in the CEE region practicing IT strategies, whic
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 3. Economic Transparency in 2012 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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this type of monetary policy strategy is characterized by a much greater emphasis 
on communicating monetary policy deliberations.
Figure 4. Procedural Transparency in 2012
As regards the transparency of implemented policy
CEE countries on the road to the euro adoption that currently use an inflation 
targeting strategy promptly announce their decisions on the adjustments of the 
main instrument of monetary policy
provided only in the event of changes (and/ or they are superficial).
The European Central Bank distinguishes itself by the immediately explaining of 
its monetary policy decisions, offering a series of forward
Instead, the communication and explanation of monetary policy decisions are not 
identified if CBs target the exchange rate. Publication of the future direction of 
monetary policy or explicit indications on the most likely actions can b
in the Czech Republic; from such a perspective CBs geared towards inflation 
targeting end to remain quite opaque.
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Figure 5. Policy Transparency in 2012
The approach of operational transparency
openness to error control is specific to the European Central Bank and to CBs 
aimed at targeting inflation. From this perspective, selected central banks applying 
an IT strategy display high heterogeneity; however, the criterion is on
fulfilled by Poland and Hungary and absent in the Czech Republic and Romania. 
The central banks position in the last two mentioned countries is similar to those 
targeting the exchange rate, with error control not specific to their practice. No
provision by the central bank of information on macroeconomic (unanticipated) 
shocks that affect the transmission of monetary policy appears when targeting the 
exchange rate. 
Figure 6. Operational Transparency in 2012
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Disclosure of information related to macroeconomic shocks affecting the 
transmission mechanism, drawn from the research of short-term macroeconomic 
developments occurs in the case of certain central banks using an IT strategy 
(Poland and Hungary), but the inclusion in the analysis of previous forecast errors 
can only be identified in the case of the European Central Bank. The evaluation of 
implemented monetary policy results is more visible under a strategy of inflation 
targeting and under the ECB’s monetary policy strategy compared to the situation 
of CBs using the exchange rate as nominal anchor. 
 
5. The Relation between the Transparency of Monetary Policy and 
Macroeconomic Performances  
To identify the macroeconomic context of the evolution of monetary policy 
transparency of central banks in CEE countries acceding to the euro area, Table 1 
shows the correlation between changes in the Eijffinger-Geraats transparency index 
manifested during 1999-2012, and two key macroeconomic variables, inflation and 
GDP per capita (logarithm, based on PPP) in 1999. The results show that the initial 
level of inflation is strongly positively correlated with the subsequent increase in 
the transparency index. Thus, it appears that a higher initial inflation leads to 
enhanced transparency of the monetary policy. 
Table 1. The Correlation between the Initial Value of Certain Macroeconomic 
Variables and the Subsequent Changes of Transparency 
 Inflation (1999) Log (GDP/per capita, 1999) 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Probability Correlation 
coefficient 
Probability 
Total transparency 
(change 1999-2012) 
0,892 [0,001] 0,876 [0,000] 
Source: Author's Calculations 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients and associated p-value in square brackets. 
Coefficients in bold are significant at 5%. 
In addition, Table 1 shows that the GDP per capita is, in turn, strongly positively 
correlated with increased transparency, which suggests that central banks of 
advanced CEE economies have strengthened their monetary policy transparency.  
Another relevant issue is the determination of subsequent changes in inflation as a 
result of the adoption of transparency. Table 2 illustrates that the level of 
transparency identified for the year 1999 is strongly negatively correlated with 
subsequent changes in inflation (as the average for the years 2000-2012). Thus, it 
appears that central banks in CEE countries on the road to the euro adoption have 
used transparency to improve their credibility and diminish inflation, which falls 
  
within the theoretical arguments and e
of transparency raises the efficiency of monetary policy.
 
Table 2. The Correlation between the Initial Transparency Degree and Subsequent 
 Average inflation (2000
Inflation 
rate targeting
Correlation 
coefficient
Total transparency 
(1999) 
-0,737
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients and associated p
Coefficients in bold are significant at 5%.
If central banks using the exchange rate as nominal anchor are excluded from the 
sample, the correlation between the degree of tra
inflation become stronger. 
The result is logical if we consider that transparency has a disciplinary effect on 
discretionary monetary policy reducing the inflation bias and sacrifice ratio. 
However, this is not present und
in this case the central bank's commitment to maintain the exchange rate stability 
constraints CBs monetary policy actions, as transparency generates a less 
significant effect (Geraats, 2009).
ŒCONOMIC
mpirical literature stating that a high degree 
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Probability Correlation 
coefficient 
Probability
 [0,037] -0,821 [0,049]
Source: Author's Calculations 
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Figure 7. The Relationship between Transparency, Inflation and GDP Per Capita 
The relations between transparency and inflation on the one hand and the level of 
transparency and real economic activity on the 
7. Central banks applying exchange rate targeting strategies tend to have low levels 
of transparency and diminished inflation. Their commitment towards maintaining a 
fixed exchange rate allows for reduced inflation rate
contrast, central banks that use an inflation targeting strategy enjoy in most cases a 
high level of transparency corresponding to a low inflation. The ECB also reveals a 
high degree of transparency corresponding to depressed
hand, countries where the CB uses a strategy of exchange rate targeting present 
only limited transparency of the monetary authority and of the GDP per capita. In 
comparison, CEE states with CBs geared towards inflation targeting ha
stronger economic development and transparency of central banks.
 
6. Conclusions 
Analysis of recent trends in the transparency of central banks’ monetary policy in 
Central and Eastern European countries on the road to euro adoption with emphasis 
on the types of strategies monetary policy uses has provided five important 
conclusions: first, increased transparency of all selected monetary authorities 
regardless of the monetary policy strategy; 
transparency in case of monetary authorities targeting inflation compared to CBs 
using the exchange rate as nominal anchor, which is consistent with the 
anticipatory nature of inflation targeting, transparency and accountability actually 
representing the essential pillars of th
transparency of the ECB when compared to the average of monetary authorities 
directly targeting inflation; 
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with the initial levels of inflation and the economic development; fifth, the presence 
of a significant negative correlation between the transparency of monetary policy 
implemented by central banks and inflation, countries where central banks have a 
higher transparency tend to experience a lower level of inflation thereafter; sixth, 
the existence of a high degree of transparency, low inflation and a strong economic 
development altogether in countries where CB is geared towards  inflation 
targeting compared to countries where monetary authorities uses the exchange rate 
as nominal anchor. Given the severe impact of the recent financial on central banks 
transparency levels we propose as future research direction the investigation of 
these implications on the five elements that define the transparency of monetary 
policy implemented by central banks.  
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